Not Even Close to Being Game-Related (Little Upsilon)

Okay, so I'm going to write about my current working hypothesis on none other than language (very roughly). What is my hypothesis? Well, all words are the result one of two processes: integration and differentiation. The second is necessary only because of the first. Therefore, it would seem more accurate to account for language as the result of conceptual integration. I imagine a few questions arise from this: (1) What the heck do you mean by integration and differentiation? (2) Why does integration take precedence over differentiation? (3) Can you speak English, please?

By integration, I am referring to the process by which the mind processes and, specifically, organizes real-world data (sense data). The process of organization is best labeled integration because the mind will consider various particular events and organize a concept according to that which all the events have in common. For example, say you see several objects on your table. All of them share a property. It really doesn't matter what property they share, but upon viewing these objects, your mind notices the common property and creates a concept to account for it. Say they are all blue objects. The concept blue is represented by the common property of these objects. This may be contentious, but supposing that you've never seen the color blue before, this is the best manner with which to account for how the idea of blue comes into your skull. It would be an immense folly to attribute the concept of blue to anything other than direct observation of the sense data, blue. Depending on the thickness of your skull, it is easy enough to recognize that the concept of blue exists independently of the word blue, but not of the blue objects. When I say that it does not exist independently of the blue objects, I mean that if there were no blue objects, you could never have the concept of blue. Of course, once you've seen blue objects. The concept no longer depends upon the objects. This description has nothing to do with language, but must necessarily precede any discussion of language since one must be able to account for how words come into being. This description merely accounts for words derived from quality, but no doubt applies to words derived from relations as well. In the case of relations (such as the concept of right/left), it is the comparison of two or more objects that accounts for the concept. Every word, except the last on a line, is to the right of another word. In the above line, "word" is to the right of "every," "every" is to the right of "concept," and "concept" is to the right of "the." The concept here is formed by the common relationship among various sets of words. The corollary concept is that of left, seen by doing the reverse. These concepts are derived directly from perception of various properties associated with objects or relationships among objects.

The skeptic will have arguments ready to counter this explanation on the origin of abstracts, but they are not well-founded. There is a pretty simple challenge. Identify a concept that has no reference to anything that exists. If you're cleverly thinking up of a counter-argument, you may as well stop. I intend on explaining why you will always fail. There are concepts that result from the integration of other concepts, but ultimately, the concepts integrated into another concept will eventually, if not immediately, reference concepts derived from experience. The reasoning is as follows: in order to form a concept from concepts, you need to be able to integrate concepts. Integration presupposes understanding of the concept. In order to initially understand a concept, one must either conceptualize it from experience or relate it to existing concepts. If there are no existing concepts, a concept cannot be formed by integrating concepts. Thus, the initial material for any concept chain is experience. On a side note, this need for reference to experience is the reason why metaphors are useful.

Anyway, I'll move on to what I mean by differentiation. By this, I am referring to the process by which the mind separates and identifies specific entities among organized data. While not precisely self-evident, it is nonetheless easy to see how differentiation presupposes integration. The data needs to be already integrated and organized in order to necessitate the process of differentiation. Remember, my concern is primarily with language here. In absence of conceptualization, one can merely point to something or create an idea of a particular thing in absence of everything else. However, this does not neatly account for thought. When I think about the idea of blue, I am not simultaneously thinking about every blue object that I have ever seen. When I think about 'the specific blue car I noticed around 10:30 P.M. Jan 4, 2011 outside C.V.S.,' I'm primarily considering the object as it is separate from other objects. That car is a particular instance of a great many concepts and I primarily consider it in relation to these concepts when I sort it out. In effect, my mind seems to partially reconstruct the car from memory according to the various ideas I've categorized it into. It was a blue Nissan Sentra. The process of differentiation is apparent in the fact that I consider this car primarily by how the different concepts inadequately describe the specific car and thus layer on additional concepts. "Blue," "car," "around 10:30 PM," "Jan 4, 2011," "outside C.V.S.," "Nissan," and "Sentra" are all concepts derived from experience of various particulars. In layering on the concepts, I am excluding more and more objects (thus differentiating the object from others). If I had noticed the license plate number, I would have the final piece of differentiation to render it completely unique from all other blue Nissan Sentras. This would best signify the that emphasized earlier. Given that I do not, the time and place serve as stamps of differentiation. If there were multiple blue Nissan Sentras at that time and place, I would need to be more specific in differentiating it. The more unique the trait I focus on, the better the process of differentiation. Proper names are the best example in language. Hmm, I seem to be rambling now. Anyway, my point is that differentiation, as a process of language, presupposes integrated concepts. Why? The natural tendency of the mind is to organize real-world data into concepts, and it is this that necessitates the process of differentiation which can either occur by layering on integrating words or using differentiating words. Otherwise, there would be one idea for EVERY particular instance of a thing.

I hope that I didn't stumble too badly there, but let's move on. The final question wasn't really serious, I hope to explain things as best I can without confusing anyone, but integration and differentiation seem to be the best words to describe the processes involved in word creation. If we aren't skeptical at this point, we can see that the mind's primary response to reality is to sort various perceived objects into categories called concepts. One object can exist in a multitude of categories. One category consists of multiple objects. A stroll through the dictionary will reveal the most surprising of facts, each word represents a concept. The definition defines an organizing principle, integrating certain objects. However, it is important to note that words are not required for integration, but occur as a result of integration. If this were not the case, no words could have initially come into existence, and no new words could come into being. As to those other words, the ones primarily used for the purposes of differentiation (proper names, pronouns, possessives, and other words intended primarily to denote something specific), these exist because of the natural tendency of words to denote concepts rather than specific instances. I believe I mentioned the notion that we might otherwise require a specific word for every individual instance of a thing.

If we do examine even these differentiators, we nonetheless notice something else. They are also integrators in that they integrate every trait of a person, place, or thing into one word. "Scarlet," as a word, is the integrator of everything that one knows about me. So we must come to the conclusion that every word integrates various aspects of something into one concept. The concept of "Scarlet" is the set of all traits belonging to a specific entity. The concept of orange is the set of all entities sharing the same trait. In effect, we realize that a word is simply represents a concept and a concept is a set of things with a commonality. On a side note, the fact that a word results ultimately from sets of things with commonalities is the reason why words sometimes have multiple similar, and sometimes antagonizing, meanings. The dependence of language on concept formation explains such looseness in meanings. The need to represent concepts rather than repeatedly point out particular instances best explain the form that words take.

tl;dr
Words represent concepts, where concepts represent the integration of various perceptions or conceptions according to a shared commonality which may either be an entity that aspects share or an aspect that entities share.

Too much to read

So.... basically early post-Kantian phenomenology?

Too much to read...Want a beer?

Interesting.

This may not be aimed at your main point, but I have a question: why can't we think of blue without having ever seen anything blue? Let's say we've seen yellow, orange, red, but never anything blue. Could our minds extrapolate, and imagine blue? The cause of the sensation of blue is only different in wavelength than the cause of other colors.

Could we someday program an advanced computer to see blue? Not just respond to blue, but to actually perceive blueness?

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Needs work.

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Maybe. I must confess my ignorance of phenomenology, but I'm sure that it's post-Kantian (my philosophic background is amateurish). Anyway, would that make it ill-founded or well-refuted? If so, what are the general problems with this view?

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No thanks.

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Interesting.

This may not be aimed at your main point, but I have a question: why can't we think of blue without having ever seen anything blue? Let's say we've seen yellow, orange, red, but never anything blue. Could our minds extrapolate, and imagine blue? The cause of the sensation of blue is only different in wavelength than the cause of other colors.

Could we someday program an advanced computer to see blue? Not just respond to blue, but to actually perceive blueness?<!-/Quote-!>

I don't think that extrapolation of any primary sensation (color, sound, etc.) is possible from reference to other primary sensations. To give an example, can I imagine what ultra-violet light looks like? Given all the information about wavelengths and stuff of that nature, I still lack the primary sensation of ultraviolet even though the cause of ultraviolet light is merely a different wavelength and UV rays do reach your eyes. I think if somehow my visual spectrum were widened, I would be very surprised what color UV would appear as. There is no reason to believe that a hypothetical being's visual spectrum would have to be limited to our human visual spectrum.

As far as computers actually perceiving blue (as opposed to simply responding), I think Searle kind of killed that possibility with his Chinese Room (if I'm not misunderstanding it, it illustrates the fact that consciousness is not the same as brain function since consciousness is the method of deriving meaning) . . . eventually, I imagine a method of replicating consciousness in a computer may become possible, but it won't be achieved without further study into the nature of consciousness (as something separate from, though caused by, brain states).

"Maybe. I must confess my ignorance of phenomenology, but I'm sure that it's post-Kantian (my philosophic background is amateurish). Anyway, would that make it ill-founded or well-refuted? If so, what are the general problems with this view?"

It's a stance that I more or less hold myself. There is a lot you could read about this that would both advance your thought, raise new questions, and conform/solidify the grounding you already expounded. The philosophy of language and phenomenology have grown up together in the 20th century as rival siblings, not always happy with each other but always in dialogue.

A large part of what you are describing sounds like he idea of intentional consciousness, which a lot of people trace to Kant's Critiques (of Pure Reason, I believe). He says that our minds impose an intentional order on the world. Everything we perceive as order, natural categories, and relationships, is really the work of our rational mind imposing categories on raw sensory data in order to make sense of and understand reality.

In phenomenology, "intention" later becomes paired with "intuition," which can be basically understood as all that raw data. When we come into contact with a phenomenon, we receive an intuition of what it is through how it appears to us. The intentional faculty of our consciousness then allows us to understand that object through its categorizing function. Not all intuition is created equal, but that's another topic (and remember, "intuition" is meant in a specific, technical way here, not like when your crazy aunt starts talking about her intuition. It's more related to the literal meaning of to intuit.).

So that's kind of what you were talking about with the idea of abstracting the concept of blue from several blue objects. That would be a function of your intentionality creating categories, which is closely related to conceptualization. We break things down into concepts and categories in order to understand them and their place in our reality.

When you talked about the example of the Nissan Sentra, you were very close to what is referred to as the problem of representation. Again, this is closely related.

Basically, the problem of representation is that thought, memory, language, etc, are all functions of re-presenting experience. Re-presentation is a function of communication, because to make something re-presented is to make it communicable and intelligible for others.

The original experience itself is a particularity that only exists for you, as you experienced it. In order to communicate the experience to another person, you must first destroy that experience by turning it into something that is no longer a particular but something that can be shared (You destroy the experience as THAT experience, as such, because THAT experience AS YOU experienced it cannot be communicated to another person). Thus you turn it into a representation that is LIKE the original experience, but fundamentally it is something different that you created because it is a representation. A good analogy would be a painting or a photograph. These are images that share something not present and a moment no longer there, yet through them we have access to something LIKE what they represent.

In both art and paintings, there is also the influence of the person communicating. Everything is shaded or colored by the person's intentionality. The scope of the photo captures what they think is important and marginalizes or omits that which it beyond the lens. The artist makes conscious decisions about how to portray things, and those choices emphasize or marginalize as well. So it's more than a simple "you can't feel the breeze" when looking at a photo.

This applies to language and our use of words in a major way. My favorite example is one using leaves.

When I say (or type) "leaf," no doubt a certain image comes into your head. We have all seen leaves, but different people will think of different types of leaves. Nevertheless, we all understand what is *meant* by "leaf." However, EVERY leaf is different. Even on the same tree, there are an uncountable number of leaves and each is subtly different than the others. Yet, we are able to think of the same concept when we say "leaf." This is because we are able to abstract what the particular phenomena of leaves is and turn it into a concept that we can then express. That is to say, when you think "leaf" you don't think of EVERY leaf you have ever seen. That would be impossible. You abstract your experience of leaves, turn it into a concept, and then re-present that concept in the word "leaf" which everyone is able to understand.

All language and communication then, is this function of representation.

Edit: I haz degree.

I believe a lot of this is covered in a very useful and accessible way in Stanley Grenz's "Primer on Postmodernism." It's an around 200 page (maybe less) paperback that you should be able to pick up for around $13 on amazon.

Thanks! Degrees are useful things, I hope to have one in a few years.

Another way of looking at this discussion is from the viewpoint of context and constructed meaning. We may be able to independently establish meaning to an object or concept. But much of meaning comes from not only past experiences that may be attributed to an object but also the constructed meanings attributed by a group of people through conversation, stories and experiences.

In the 1980 film “The God’s must be Crazy� a coke bottle falls out of the sky on a tribe of indigenous people in Africa who had never been exposed to civilization, much less a coke bottle. Among other things, the film focuses on the meanings attributed to the coke bottle presence and how the tribe dealt with this new influence. Over time and with the widening of conversations and experiences the meaning of the coke bottle changed. In a broader sense that’s the way we come to attribute meaning to words and concepts—through our past experiences and the deconstruction of our understanding of those words with the result of creating a new constructed meaning for the word. By sharing our stories and understanding with others we deconstruct our own stories and in that context create new stories/understandings of the word/concept. This happens primarily in the conversations that we have with one another. So, even though we may never have seen blue, we still have context and through shared experiences or even with independent experience our understanding of blue changes.

Over time meanings may change as culture re-negotiates those meanings. Take a word like “gay�. In old 1930’s movies people would sometimes refer to a person being “gay� with a meaning being that the person is happy or light hearted. Today, the meaning has a completely changed.

So, even though integration and differentiation take place in the individual it is greatly influenced by the context and interaction with our environment and particular with the sharing of meanings in conversation. And even though those of us on this thread may see words and meanings through different lenses, it may be that with each perspective we cast a new light on our understanding of the meanings of words.

Interesting discussion. Scarlet, as usual you give us much food for thought. Keep up the good work.

Both the personal and social context are relevant, I like to think of the meaning attached to a word in the same terms as I think about of supply-and-demand - that is, the objective meaning (price) is the result of leveling effect of many different subjective meanings (personal value) attached to it. As usage changes, the objective meaning is altered by many small changes in subjective meaning. A new word is like a new product in the market. A new variant usage is like an alteration of the product . . . in some cases, the alteration isn't accepted (like Coke's new formula), Obviously, this works mostly as a metaphor rather than an exacting explanation.

A good example of this is what's happening with gourmet. It's slowly moving from indicating some high-quality cuisine to just meaning decent food because it's being applied more and more on stuff like frozen dinners. The fact that the meaning of the word is being altered by the connotations/denotations of what it is associated with, rather than the thing it is associated with acquiring the connotations/denotations of the word is interesting.

For those promoting PC language (at least in the case of substituting words), it might serve as a lesson that viewpoints can't be changed by altering the language . . . it might better serve to change the foundations of value upon which the viewpoints developed that gave the original words their negative connotations. I imagine some of the current PC words will wind up having the same sense of the old words. As near as I can see, special is getting there. The number of times African American is used to describe any black person, even Africans, is amusing. Gay was probably an attempt to get rid of negative connotations, but it has only acquired negative connotations. However, the case of something like having people say Happy Holidays instead of Merry Christmas seems to contradict this. I think the obvious de-deification of Christmas is, well, too obvious - for the many people whom Christ-mas means anything - to swallow.

Often enough, I see a PC word wielded in a similar manner as a deemed inappropriate counterpart. On the opposite end, I've seen it once or twice that the inappropriate word was used with no sign of ill-will, the person using it just didn't know another word. More often than not, the person using the supposedly PC or supposedly inappropriate word has the idea of the people they're addressing in their head already and the word they use doesn't matter so much to the ideas in their head. Ultimately, the conclusion that I've drawn from all my experience with the subject of PC acceptable/unacceptable language is that the word matters less than the idea in the person's head (drawn from that oh so important tone/context/body language). In effect, I'm led to question the power of changing peoples ideas through changing language - and assign the power to people's ideas in changing language.

Don't take this as a support of derogatory language. The exist of a polite word is useful for clearing a slate, but the point I'm addressing is the fact that the old meaning creeps in if the slate is cleared and nothing else changes.

For a number of years i've been fascinated by an idea called the Holographic Paradign. It's kind of out there but is very intriguing and I think is germane to our discussion. The idea starts with the premise that thoughts, particularly visual and sensate thoughts do not reside in only one place in the brain. They reside in numerous places and somehow come together to form the image. This author says that these sensate images form a hologram that we perceive.

He goes on to say that our perception of the universe also is constructed holographically. He says that what we see and perceive is in reality the atoms and super strings that make up all matter, but that we don't see those because our perceptions of reality is holographic. i think the theory breaks down some when i bang my head against a wall, but it's still interesting. So, our brain constructs a way of perceiving that is only one reality.

I think that holds true for our perception of language and communication. Those images and representations in language can at best be an approximations of the reality that we perceive and that there are other realities unknown to us by those same representations. Additionally, others may have a different perception of the same reality.

Our world seems to be demanding certainty in an uncertain universe. But being able to accept the uncertainty and the unknowingness can be a beautiful experience. My wife and I just celebrated our fiftieth anniversary. there was a time when I thought she was boring since I thought I had her all figured out. It was only when I came to realize that her seeming simplicity was a beautiful mystery that was yet to be explored and understood.

I think that's the way words and life are--a great God given mystery.

1 Corinthians 13:12

Language is a process of free creation; its laws and principles are fixed, but the manner in which the principles of generation are used is free and infinitely varied. Even the interpretation and use of words involves a process of free creation.
-Noam Chomsky

Without, hopefully, sounding too esoteric, the process of language seems to carry greater weight than the mechanics of it. Expression of abstract idea is uniquely human, and is, therefore, wonderfully diverse in its methodology.

I will humbly defer to those with better information; however, Thank you Scarlett for raising the bar on forum discourse.